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As conflicts increasingly fall within the Gray Zone—that is, outside the traditional 
peace-or-war construct—the U.S. military must understand how to succeed in this 
ambiguous environment and counter its threats. A key challenge is understanding how to 
employ the tools available in the Gray Zone—the primary tool being Special Operation 
Forces (SOF). This research finds that policymakers and others outside of SOF have 
often misapplied this tool, due to limited understanding of SOF roles and competencies. 
This limited understanding or misperception of SOF may have a detrimental effect on the 
ability of the Unites States to reach its foreign policy goals. This research analyzes U.S. 
SOF employment in the Gray Zone, breaking down constituent components and 
identifying those of greater importance. Characteristics of the Gray Zone and irregular 
warfare are considered, and a holistic approach to the use of irregular warfare in the Gray 
Zone is proposed. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin’s bureaucratic politics model is 
used to discern the factors that shape the perception of SOF. Two historical cases are 
viewed through the lens of the bureaucratic politics model to show how SOF capabilities 
must be well understood and properly employed to achieve desired U.S. policy goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our success in this environment [the Gray Zone] will be determined by 
our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the 
traditional peace-or-war construct. In this “Gray Zone,” we are confronted 
with ambiguity on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved, and the 
validity of the legal and political claims at stake. These conflicts defy our 
traditional views of war and require us to invest time and effort in 
ensuring we prepare ourselves with the proper capabilities, capacities, and 
authorities to safeguard U.S. interests. 
—General Joseph Votel, 20151 
 
As conflicts increasingly fall outside the traditional peace-or-war construct, a key 
challenge facing the U.S. military is understanding how to best employ tools in the Gray 
Zone. This research finds that policymakers and others have often misapplied the primary 
resource available—Special Operation Forces (SOF)—due to limited understanding of its 
roles and competencies. This limited understanding or misperception of SOF may have a 
detrimental impact on the ability of the Unites States to reach its foreign policy goals. 
This research analyzes U.S. SOF employment in the Gray Zone, breaking down 
constituent components and identifying those of greater importance. Characteristics of 
the Gray Zone and irregular warfare are considered, and a holistic approach to the use of 
IW in the Gray Zone is proposed. Graham Allison and Morton Halperin’s bureaucratic 
politics model is used to discern the factors that shape the perception of SOF, and two 
historical cases are viewed through the lens of the bureaucratic politics model to show 
how SOF capabilities must be well understood and properly employed to achieve desired 
U.S. policy goals.2  
                                                 
1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016: Special Operations Forces in Uncertain 
Threat Environment, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 114
th
 
Cong., 2 (2015) (statement of Joseph L. Votel, Commander of United States Special Operations 
Command), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2015_hr/031815votel.pdf. 
2 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications,” World Politics 24, no. S1 (1972): 40–79; Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp, and Arnold 
Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006). 
2 
A. THE GRAY ZONE 
General Joseph Votel, commander of the United States Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) introduced the term “Gray Zone” on March 18, 2015, in a 
statement to the House Armed Service Committed Subcommittee on Emerging Threats 
and Capabilities.3 In September 2015, under the direction of General Votel, USSOCOM 
released a white paper, “The Gray Zone,” in which the zone is defined as “competitive 
interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional 
war and peace duality.”4 This definition informs the Gray Zone discussions now 
underway in related academic and policymaking circles, with analysis centering on the 
following points:  
While acknowledgment of the complex interactions that are neither war nor peace 
is not new, policymakers and strategists have grown increasingly interested in this 
neglected aspect of international competition as they realize that most U.S. force 
employment now falls beyond the traditional concepts of war.5 Military operations after 
World War II happened primarily in the Gray Zone, including almost all Cold War 
activities.6 George Kennan expressed his concern about the misapprehensions 
surrounding Gray Zone political warfare during a policy meeting with the National 
Security Council in 1948:  
We [Americans] have been handicapped however by a popular attachment 
to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war, by a tendency 
to view war as a sort of sporting context outside of all political context, by 
a national tendency to seek for a political cure-all, and by a reluctance to 
recognize the realities of international relations--the perpetual rhythm of 
struggle, in and out of war.7 
                                                 
3 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. 
4 Philip Kapusta. “The Gray Zone,” Special Warfare 28, no. 4 (October 2015): 20. 
5 Kapusta, “The Gray Zone.” 
6 Joseph L Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare 
in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly 80 (2016): 101–109 
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf. 
7 George Kennan, “269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum: The Inauguration of Organized Political 
Warfare,” National Security Council Records. May 4, 1948. 
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm. 
3 
Kennan’s 20th century description of perpetual struggle, both within and short of 
war, applies equally today. The major difference is that while Cold War conflicts were 
played in the Gray Zone to forestall nuclear war, today, with nuclear war unlikely, Gray 
Zone competition is pursued as an end in se.  
Adam Elkus is among critics who argue that the Gray Zone concept is a “flash in 
the pan” that does little to further discussion of the strategic space between war and peace 
and adds confusion to well-recognized phenomena identified in political science and 
strategic-studies research.8 Nevertheless, the current focus on Gray Zone realities has 
precipitated a much-needed reappraisal of the environment and required policymakers, 
senior military leaders, and national-security scholars to review historical cases of gray 
war involvement to ascertain what the future may hold and to guide policy. The debate 
has also forced those in the debate to review what tools are needed in this environment.  
The USSOCOM white paper notes that actors “seek to secure their objective 
while minimizing the scope and scale of actual fighting”—a critical point in the Gray 
Zone discussion.9 Of the military tools available, SOF, with its robust breadth of 
capabilities, is generally best able to deliver results in the environment; yet it is applied 
preponderantly in counterterrorism (CT) and direct action. This research explores why 
SOF is used so narrowly, given its broad capabilities.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary questions considered in this research are as follows: 
1. What perceptions do policymakers have regarding the utility of Special 
Operations Forces? 
2. What impact do these perceptions have on the application of SOF in Gray 
Zone environments?  
To narrow these questions, the following inquiries are made:  
                                                 
8 Adam Elkus, “Abandon All Hope, Ye Who Enter Here: You Cannot Save the Gray Zone Concept,” 
War on the Rocks, December 30, 2015, http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/abandon-all-hope-ye-who-enter-
here-you-cannot-save-the-gray-zone-concept/; Adam Elkus, “50 Shades of Gray: Why the Gray Wars 
Concept Lacks Strategic Sense,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2015, 
http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/50-shades-of-gray-why-the-gray-wars-concept-lacks-strategic-sense/.  
9 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. 
4 
 From the American perspective, what is the difference between war and 
peace?  
 Who has historically operated in the environment between war and peace?  
 What method of warfare works best in the Gray Zone?  
 What factors influence how SOF is perceived by policymakers?  
 Who influences whether and when force is applied in the Gray Zone? 
 What model, if any, can elucidate the process by which policymakers 
decide whether to apply force? 
This research provides qualitative analysis of two cases of U.S. involvement in 
Gray Zone conflicts. To understand the decisions and actions of policymakers in these 
cases, Allison and Halperin’s bureaucratic politics model is used. This model allows 
parsing of the players involved as to shared images (perceptions) and interests. The 
model uses a layered approach to look at the three “games” that drive the formation of 
U.S. foreign policy: the action, decision, and policy games.10 In the action game, 
organizations within SOF communicate their utility upstream to those responsible for 
decisions and policy. Together, the decision and policy games illuminate how a decision 
to apply SOF is made. The employment of SOF tends to be shaped by perception and the 
presumed arena of the possible, which changes slowly unless shocked by a major event 




terrorist attacks.  
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II addresses the space between war and peace and how the Gray Zone in 
more detail. The Gray Zone concept is analyzed with a discussion of which methods 
works best in the zone and description of the characteristics a force requires to conduct 
these methods. All of these elements are examined independently to understand their 
unique characteristics and demonstrate their intricate interdependencies. Chapter II also 
looks at irregular warfare as a method of force application within the Gray Zone and how 
SOF has evolved into an irregular warfare tool. Chapter III presents the approach used in 
reviewing the case studies, discusses perceptions of SOF, and introduces the use of the 
                                                 
10 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics.” 
5 
BMP for insight into decision making and the employment of SOF in the Gray Zone. 
Chapter IV reviews two cases of U.S. intervention: in Somalia from 1992–1993 and the 
Philippines from 2001–2014. In both cases, the players and games, and the perceptions 
that influenced SOF employment are discussed. Chapter V summarizes conclusions, 
identifies factors that may influence the future perception of SOF, and suggests follow-up 
research. This research finds that if SOF is given clear and concise policy objectives and 
the time to assess, plan, and execute a thorough irregular warfare campaign, it is likely to 
achieve policy objectives in the ambiguous environment between war and peace.  
 
6 
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II. THE GRAY ZONE: DEFINITION AND APPROACH 
The authors build upon SOCOM’s definition of the Gray Zone by proposing that 
it is the system of environments between war and peace, relative to the actor (whether 
state or non-state), in which lethal actions and peaceful exchanges ebb and flow, pushing 
the limits of internationally accepted norms. This elaboration adds depth by 
accommodating the extremes of war and peace while retaining the notion of subjective 
experience on the part of the actors involved. Figure 1 depicts the Gray Zone continuum. 
 
Figure 1.  The Gray Zone Within the Spectrum of Conflict 
This definition is not intended to resolve the larger debates regarding the Gray 
Zone but allows the analysis in this thesis to be structured in a transparent manner. 
Expanding on this provisional definition, the Gray Zone is a collection of environments 
that may or may not be similar in nature, but are intertwined within a specific problem, 
conflict, or challenge. A given Gray Zone is defined by specific actors. For example, the 
Ukrainian government is likely to view its current crisis as an existential threat, while 
Russia would not (and any involvement of the United States will be further away from 
the left side of Figure 1).11 In other words, a given conflict may slide closer to war or 
peace depending on the situation and perspective of the actor involved. Within the Gray 
Zone, both lethal military action and peaceful diplomatic exchanges may occur and these 
exchanges may push the limits of internationally accepted norms—a point of concern in 
                                                 
11 Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” 22. 
 
War Peace           
The system of environments between war and peace, relative to the actor (state /non-state), in which lethal 
actions and peaceful exchanges ebb and flow, pushing the limits of internationally accepted norms. 
 
An existential threat violently 
advances to topple a state’s civil, 
cultural, and legal institutions 
A state’s established civil, 
cultural, and legal institutions 
can resolve conflict without 
sustained violence 
8 
the modern world. As Michael Mazarr notes, common interests tie most states, but this 
does not translate to everyone’s approving the status quo, and this dissatisfaction may 
become an engine for Gray Zone conflict.12 To add complexity, it is not only violent 
extremist organizations that may demonstrate their dissatisfaction but also major states. 
This poses difficulties for the United States, which increasingly has found that traditional 
deterrents or sanctions may not work as solutions to problems with non-state actors. 
Russia, for example, is conducting aggressive territorial incursions, and China is 
expanding into the East and South China Seas, despite disapproval from the United States 
and others. Strategies within the Gray Zone employed today must counter both state and 
non-state actors. This chapter looks at the current debate over the Gray Zone, breaks 
down the concept of irregular warfare and its utility, and examines how special 
operations forces are designed to operate within the Gray Zone. By delineating the unique 
aspects of Gray Zone conflict, this research seeks to help makers and executors of policy 
grasp the complexity of these problems.  
A. THE GRAY ZONE DEBATE 
For the idea of the Gray Zone to be useful, it must be disentangled from other 
concepts. In the current debate, critics generally place the Gray Zone into one of three 
mental bins, as a strategy, conflict, or condition.13  
Considered as a strategy, the Gray Zone is taken to mean the analytical 
framework that military operations must follow to achieve desired objectives. 
Considered, alternatively, as a conflict, the Gray Zone emerges from a collation of the 
interrelated events that distinguish an overall situation and which cumulatively depart 
from the “steady state” of affairs. Understanding the Gray Zone as a condition helps 
leaders and analysts tease out the nuances of a given situation and identify those elements 
that require special attention in planning and executing operations.  
                                                 
12 Michael Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” Strategic 
Studies Institute, December 2015, 10, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1303.pdf.   
13 Allison Astorino-Courtois, “Conceptualizing Grey Deterrence” (PowerPoint presentation provided 
to authors, Tampa, FL, February 26, 2016). 
9 
All three classifications are relevant but in different ways. Strategies are critical 
when focusing the effects of military operations; conflict labeling establishes a definitive 
starting and ending points for a situation, and conditions help identify specific strategies 
or techniques that military forces may consider in a particular conflict. For this research, 
the authors find that the Gray Zone is most usefully considered a condition, or more 
specifically, as a general environmental condition. 
1. The Gray Zone as a Condition 
A vast literature exists on strategy and conflict, and the admixing of the Gray 
Zone into the discussion can add more confusion than value. Concepts like political, 
traditional, irregular, and asymmetric warfare simplify strategies and have a substantial 
literature and military doctrine backing their usefulness. Frank Hoffman argues that the 
Gray Zone is the initial phase of an adversary’s strategy,14 while Mazarr vaguely 
describes the Gray Zone as a spectrum of operations that would collectively create a 
campaign plan.15 These arguments for the Gray Zone as a strategy add too little value to 
help in structuring a military or political action amid a situation. Likewise, while small 
wars, low-intensity conflicts, and military operations other than war have been used to 
describe the complexities of a conflict that falls short of war in the public estimation, 
labeling the Gray Zone as a kind of conflict does little to further understanding of how 
the United States should contend with the modern threat environment.16 Considering the 
Gray Zone as an environmental condition may be only modestly profitable, but it 
contributes insight that strategic institutions may use to view the environment in which 
they operate.  
Over the past century, U.S. conflicts have fallen by nearly a 12:1 ratio into the 
Gray Zone, as defined by multiple environments, actor relativity, and fluid violence.17 
The major variable historically has been how international norms influence what 
                                                 
14 Frank Hoffman, “Countering Contemporary Threats: Full Spectrum Conflict in the 21st Century” 
(PowerPoint presentation provided to the authors, Washington, DC, November 18, 2015).  
15 Mazarr, “Mastering the Gray Zone,” 25. 
16 Kapusta, “The Gray Zone.” 
17 Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” 21. 
10 
acceptable actions or reactions are conceivable. For the military, these norms include 
acceptable collateral damage, troop-number commitments, and resourcing. It is important 
to consider these nuances and particulars in understanding Gray Zone conditions. 
2. The Gray Zone and Institutional Relations 
To grasp conditions in the Gray Zone, it is necessary to understand who or what 
entities must contend with its complexities, as both state institutions and non-state actors 
may have an extreme influence on the military’s ability to achieve goals. Except insofar 
as it pertains to the bureaucratic politics model, organizational design and bureaucratic 
functioning are beyond the scope of this research. Ideally, governmental organizations 
function in the most effective and efficient way possible. For those within the leviathan 
that is the U.S. government, that idealistic assumption is far from reality, as suggested in 
Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  The Unity of Effort within U.S. Bureaucracy 
At the macro level, it is safe to assume that most taxpayers would like to see 
government agencies interlock like the puzzle pieces at the left of Figure 2—specialists in 
each field working efficiently together, first within their puzzle piece, then connecting 
tightly with one another, with no gaps to create problems. Unfortunately, the right side of 
11 
the figure is more representative of reality. Policies and responsibilities do not line up 
neatly with requirements and capabilities and, at the macro level, agencies frequently fail 
to communicate or share resources. This disconnection exposes the rough seams between 
agencies, and the misaligned interfaces represent exploitable vulnerabilities within the 
system. The individual gaps among organizations may not pose a serious threat at any 
given time to the overall functioning of the system; but as more entities become involved 
in a Gray Zone situation, these vulnerabilities become troubling, because success within 
the Gray Zone often requires action from multiple agencies. America’s adversaries, 
knowingly or not, have begun to exploit these gaps by working below the threshold of 
violence that demands military retaliation in response, or shrouding their actions in 
enough doubt to discourage action to be taken at all. With the difficulties of the status 
quo in mind, this research presents a method of warfare appropriate to the Gray Zone. 
B. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE GRAY ZONE  
Traditional methods of warfare may be imprudent or inefficacious in the Gray 
Zone. If, for example, an insurgency were heavily active in areas where enemies and 
civilians mingled, the United States would not be able to utilize large armored formations 
or widespread bombing to realize its desired end state of enemy death and civilian safety. 
Where traditional warfare is not the solution, irregular warfare, which differs radically 
from traditional warfare, may succeed.  
Carl von Clausewitz, widely regarded as the greatest Western military theorist, 
proposed a “paradoxical trinity” as a useful tool to simplify the actors required to achieve 
victory. Clausewitz identified three significant players in war, presented graphically as a 
triangle. At the base corners of the triangle are the military (chance) and the people 
(passion), with the government (reason) at the apex, as shown in Figure 3.18  
  
                                                 
18 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 89. 
12 
 
The arrow indicates the intended direction of the effects while the dashed line represents 
an attempt to avoid or minimize that side’s relevance.  
 
Figure 3.  The Paradoxical Trinity19 
In Figure 3, both the military and the people support the government; and if the 
military or people waiver or are defeated, the government is made vulnerable. In its 
purest form, that is, if the political purpose of war is not connected to the actual conflict, 
war is an act of violence that means to force the enemy to one’s will;20 the goal is to 
influence, coerce, or compel a government or political authority to conform to an 
alternative way of thinking, typically about territory, resources, or ideology. Irregular 
warfare is associated with influence over the people, where traditional warfare is enemy 
centric. Traditional warfare is  
warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in 
which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an 
adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to 
force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.21  
                                                 
19 Figure 3 is an adaptation from the Irregular Warfare Division, Joint Staff: J-7, “Traditional Warfare 
versus Irregular Warfare.” (pamphlet provided to the authors, Washington, DC, November 17, 2015). The 
authors understand that there is an ongoing debate on the interpretation and/or extension of the Paradoxical 
Trinity. However, this research bases the Trinity on the interpretation and/or extension within the DOD, 
specifically the J-7, the Joint Staff section responsible for joint doctrine and joint concepts, among other 
responsibilities. See also Christopher, Bassford and Edward J. Villacres. “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian 
Trinity,” Parameters 25, no. 3 (1995): 9–19. 
20 Clausewitz, On War, 90. 
21 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW), DOD Directive 3000.07, August 28, 2014.  
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Whereas irregular warfare concentrates lethal or nonlethal effects on a population 
to gain or erode support for the adversary’s government while rendering its military 
power irrelevant (whether lethal or nonlethal).22 Traditional warfare concentrates lethal 
effects on the adversary’s military power to defeat or neutralize it, to allow access to his 
government—all the while isolating the population (a non-lethal effect) from the conflict 
as best as possible, as in Figure 3. How then, do traditional and irregular warfare differ, 
and how does the United States define and perceive irregular warfare? 
The U.S. military has always had a complicated relationship with the concept of 
irregular warfare, defined as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”23 The prevailing American 
attitude has usually been lack of interest, adherence to a traditional hierarchy of warfare 
precedence, or a belief that being effective at traditional warfare guarantees one is 
effective at them all.24 The concept of irregular warfare remains contested within the U.S. 
military; but since June 2010, top brass have been required to take a serious look at the 
applicability and the special demands of irregular warfare.25 Irregular warfare is regarded 
in this research as the method best suited for Gray Zone conflicts.  
1. The Components of Irregular Warfare 
In addition to the official DOD definition of irregular warfare, the subsets of 
irregular warfare merit discussion. What actually constitutes irregular warfare is a matter 
of doubt. The Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy, letter 3000.07, explains that  
irregular warfare can include any relevant DOD activity and operation 
such as counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal 
defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of 




                                                 
22 “Traditional Warfare versus Irregular Warfare.” (pamphlet provided to the authors, Washington, 
DC, November 17, 2015). 
23 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW). 
24 Edward Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters XIII, no. 4 (October 8, 1983), 12. 
25 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Irregular Warfare, CJCS Instruction 3210.06, 10 June 2010. 
26 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW). 
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To conduct an effective irregular warfare campaign may require the employment 
of each type of operational technique listed. Surveying the relevant activities within 
irregular warfare, it is clear that they focus primarily on affecting a population. As 
outlined in the cases studied of this thesis, strategies that leverage a greater range of 
irregular warfare operational techniques have a greater chance of achieving long-term 
objectives over the course of a campaign. Limiting operations to the employment of only 
one or two of these techniques fails to account for the thick interdependencies of Gray 
Zone problems—an oversight that, in Somalia, led to mission failure. It is critical to grasp 
the overall concept of irregular warfare when devising a strategy in the Gray Zone, and 
not to narrow the focus to a particular technique.  
a. Counterterrorism 
Counterterrorism can be a critical aspect of an irregular warfare campaign. Joint 
Publication 3–26, Counterterrorism, states, “CT activities and operations are taken to 
neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable 
of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their 
goals.”27 As the primary purpose of CT, neutralizing organizations is typically 
accomplished through lethal strikes.  
ARSOF 2022 describes strike operations as “not always intended to be an isolated 
activity; they are executed to shape the operational environment or influence selected 
target audiences in support of larger strategic interests.”28 This qualification is echoed in 
JP 3–26, which says that CT must be a part of a holistic, interagency approach.29 CT 
provides the time and space needed for activities that are focused on the population and 
may be critical in a campaign that has reached a peak of violence, as it allows elements 
that are poorly suited to a hostile environment, such as Civil Affairs of Military 
Information Support Operations, room to maneuver. The tool used to conduct irregular 
warfare is generally SOF. 
                                                 
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (JP 3-26) (Washington, DC, 2014), I-5. 
28 US Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022,” Special Warfare Special Edition (April 
2013), 14. 
29 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (JP 3-26) (Washington, DC, 2014), viii. 
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2. Special Operations Forces 
The Gray Zone environment and methods of irregular warfare are exceedingly 
complex in their own ways and would not be well suited to the eighteen-year-old 
riflemen straight out of high school, with little life experience. These multifaceted and 
demanding situations require an individual who is a warrior and diplomat, 
interchangeable as needed. This layered identity is the true virtue of Special Operations 
Forces.   
JP 1–02 defines SOF as “those Active and Reserve Component forces of the 
Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and 
equipped to conduct and support special operations”30 and goes on to define special 
operations as 
Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, 
equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: 
time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through 
indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of 
risk.31 
In layman’s terms, SOF conducts operations that are beyond the capability of 
general-purpose forces. SOF is authorized to conduct ten codified activities, as follows:  
 direct action 
 strategic reconnaissance 
 unconventional warfare 
 foreign internal defense 
 civil affairs 
 military information-support operations 
 counterterrorism 
 humanitarian assistance 
 theater search and rescue 
                                                 
30 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02) 
(Washington DC 2010), 226. 
31 Ibid, 226. 
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SOF is often most capable when the emphasis is centered on a population, not 
only an enemy force.  
3. The Evolution of SOF  
American SOF’s existence lies within centuries of military history. Modern Army 
SOF, specifically Special Forces (SF), draw their lineage from the Office of Strategic 
Studies, which conducted special operations behind enemy lines during World War II. 
Naval Special Warfare, specifically Sea/Air/Land (SEAL) forces, began with underwater 
demolition teams that conducted surreptitious operations before many of the beach 
landings of World War II. Leaders from these early units felt that the functionality they 
provided should become a permanent asset within the U.S. military; but what these units 
needed was a patron of the highest echelon, which both SF and SEALs found that in 
President John F. Kennedy. 
Kennedy’s speech to the 1962 graduating class of West Point spoke of “another 
type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, 
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat…”33 The President put a 
premium on this type of warfare, especially as regarded Vietnam, though this was 
unpopular with many senior civilian and military leaders. With the death of Kennedy, the 
push in Vietnam shifted to a conventional approach and moved away from the combined 
military–political spheres. SOF was pushed to the periphery and eventually out of 
Vietnam completely in 1971. This was a time of turmoil for SOF, and to be a member of 
these units was viewed as a dead-end career.34 Though marginalized, SOF continued to 
operate in the shadows, and meanwhile, some new potential benefactors anticipated a 
                                                 
32 Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces10 U.S. Code § 167. 
33 John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at West Point to the Graduating Class of the U.S. Military Academy,” 
The American Presidency Project, June 6, 1962, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695.  
34 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: McGill-Queen’s Press-
MQUP, 1991), 128–134. 
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change on the horizon in the threats the United States would face and believed SOF 
would be needed to combat them. 
In 1986, the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was passed, 
essentially dictating through law that, from then on, the services within the Department of 
Defense would work in a joint environment. Some policymakers on Capitol Hill still felt 
this bill did not go far enough and that SOF needed its own command, designated 
branches for special operations within the services, and an undersecretary to the Secretary 
of Defense charged with special operations and low-intensity conflict. As a result of the 
Nunn–Cohen amendment to the National Defense Authorization of 1987, SOF was given 
a four-star command, with all the perquisites reserved for the different services, such as 
budgetary control, training, equipping, and specific authorities codified in Title 10 of the 
U.S. Code.35 Nevertheless, it still had problems within the system until the perception of 
SOF was changed by the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), which were planned and 
executed not by a nation-state, by the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda.  
National leadership needed a quick response using “fewer troops, fewer 
casualties, and thus lower political capital at risk.”36 While senior military leaders 
estimated it would take four to six months to mobilize conventional forces in Afghanistan 
with all required elements,37 within weeks, elements of SOF were on the ground, 
partnering with local resistance groups, calling in precision air strikes, and destroying 
elements of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in pursuit of the perpetrators of 9/11. By 
December, the Taliban was ready to come to the peace table and Al-Qaeda was 
decimated and forced into deep hiding.38 This SOF success in Afghanistan served as the 
catalyst for using Special Operations Forces as “man hunters” in the global war on 
terrorism. As Iraq became a focus in this campaign, SOF continued to hone its newly 
                                                 
35 “Top Secret America: Special Operations Command,” Washington Post, July 18, 2010, 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/gov-orgs/socom. 
36 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Boston: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 296. 
37 “Bush’s War,” PBS Frontline, March 24, 2008. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/  
38 Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying for: How Eleven Green Berets Fought for a New 
Afghanistan (New York: HarperCollins, 2011). 
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bestowed mission set. However, Afghanistan and Iraq were spiraling into something the 
U.S. military had not dealt with since Vietnam—insurgency. 
In Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military was thrust into a type of conflict 
outside its conventional doctrine, and was thus unequipped to pursue, other than through 
SOF. While the overall military underwent a forced relearning, the SOF itself, especially 
SF, experienced an identity crisis as its mission narrowed almost completely to man 
hunting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as opposed to the full complement of SOF 
core activities. Reverting to its roots would prove difficult, as General David Petraeus 
and other senior leaders felt that conventional forces were already well versed in 
counterinsurgency and more than capable of achieving the desired end state for the Iraq 
campaign. The surge of 2007 and use of counterinsurgency tactics by most U.S. forces in 
Iraq did achieve some positive results, though they proved short-lived as Iraq and the 
United States failed to reach a status-of-forces agreement. As SOF and other U.S. forces 
left Iraq at the end of 2011, a power vacuum was formed, exacerbated by unresolved 
problems in Iraq and civil war in neighboring Syria. This provided a perfect environment 
for the emergence of the world’s next wicked problem-set: the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL). 
C. SUMMARY 
 Special Operations Forces, irregular warfare, and the Gray Zone are tightly 
related. SOF was designed as a tool for situations in which balance must be achieved 
among population-centric and enemy-centric interactions. The arena in which SOF’s 
capabilities are used to greatest advantage is irregular warfare, where there is a balance in 
dealings with the population and enemy that must be adhered to in achieving desired 
outcomes, whether standalone or part of a strategic objective. In the Gray Zone, where 
lethal and non-lethal requirements ebb and flow, there is no clear delineation of which 
focus takes priority, whether the enemy or the people. Comprehension of the sensitive 
and powerful relationships in play is paramount when designing campaigns with a high 
probability of enhancing policy and national interests.  
19 
Chapter III examines the bureaucratic politics model, breaking down the way 
policymakers arrive at policies, decisions, and actions to lay a foundation for the case 
studies in this thesis. The chapter also discusses perception and its relation to SOF, 
dilating on how policymakers develop their perceptions to allow better analysis within 
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III. THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL AND 
PERCEPTION 
The policy arena is rarely altered unless by a tremendous event such as the 
terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. In the current arena, certain components of 
irregular warfare that SOF is capable of conducting, CT and direct action, fall within 
customary bounds and expectations, while others, such as unconventional warfare, fall 
outside. What determines where a component is assigned within the policy arena, and 
where barriers exist, how may they be identified and overcome? This chapter frames the 
inquiry by examining what influences policymaker perceptions and how leaders arrive at 
military decisions in pursuit of foreign-policy objectives. The bureaucratic-politics model 
is applied to issues within the Gray Zone to provide empirical analysis. 
As the bureaucratic politics model shows, there are conventional mechanisms that 
policymakers use to create policy and take action, and input from professionals with 
specialized information is an important mechanism that shapes these processes. 
Perception is a loose term that may be applied in a myriad of fashions—tightening the 
concept to clarify how perception shapes SOF employment, this research combines 
perception with the bureaucratic politics model to discover how policymaker decisions 
are affected by their standing categorizations of a capability. Perception may be used 
detrimentally as a cognitive shortcut that allows policymakers to bypass inputs from the 
action channel, based on preconceptions.  
This chapter highlights what perception is—how it is formed and what its 
implications may be—and lays out the bureaucratic politics model as a tool for analysis. 
It shows how perceptions of SOF utility are formed, how the bureaucratic politics model 




A. THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL  
To grasp how decision makers set policy and determine actions, and how this 
relates to the employment of SOF, this thesis applies the bureaucratic politics model of 
foreign-policy scholars Graham Allison and Morton Halperin. The bureaucratic politics 
model clarifies the governmental process by which a policy, decision or outcome 




1. Bureaucratic Politics Model Players and Games 
The bureaucratic politics model divides “players” into two categories, senior and 
junior. The senior players, who vary depending on the event or issue, are predominantly 
principals within the government e.g., the President and members of the National 
Security Council, cabinet, and Congress.
40
 The President leads the senior players, and it 
is understood that his preeminent position sets him apart.
41
 The junior players are 
deputies, senior staffers, lobbyists, members of the press, and other influential 
individuals.
42
 Because the world of politics, policy, bureaucracy, and military action is 
complex, for simplicity this research assumes all players are rational actors who will 
maximize their value in the environment, as discussed in John Steinbruner’s The 
Cybernetic Theory of Decision, which demonstrates that the fundamental characteristics 




                                                 
39 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 40–79. 
40 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 47–48. 
41 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 47; Halperin et al, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy, 16. 
42 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 47; Halperin et al, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign 
Policy, 18. 
43 Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 8–9. 
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Figure 4 depicts the three games of the bureaucratic politics model. The games 
within the bureaucratic politics model are policy, decision, and action. Policy games 
result in a policy; decision games result in decisions; and the activities that occur as result 
of policy and decision games are action games.
44
 Senior players participate in policy and 
decision games, while juniors mainly play action games.
45
 Decision games are triggered 
by an event or deadline and follow fixed rules.  
 
Figure 4.  Visualization of the Bureaucratic Politics Model46 
Action games are played as the result of a decision game in which a decision to 
perform an action has been placed in the action channel most likely to produce the 
                                                 
44 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 46. 
45 Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics,” 47–48. 
46 Figure 4 is the authors’ interpretation of Allison and Halperin’s bureaucratic politics model with 




 The results of a decision game are used in determining what actions a 
government will take in international politics.
48
  
The figure also depicts what factors bound and influence the games. In the policy 
game, the “realm of the possible” is bounded by standing polices and precedents, and 
influenced by extraneous things such as issues and deals, election cycles, the media, third 
parties, and perception. The scope of this thesis includes the role perception plays, as 
discussed in detail in this chapter. In the decision game, all these influences play a role in 
“pulling and hauling,” the process that leads to a decision as to what actions will be 
taken. Before the action game is even initiated, players from relevant government 
institutions provide expert advice through the action channel to facilitate a conclusion.49 
Once an action game is initiated, the action channel remains open to provide further 
refinement to the actions taken.    
2. Shared Images  
Shared images are the basic values and facts that most players take for granted. 
They provide the foundation of bureaucratic decision-making and help determine the 
stand a player may take on a particular issue.
50
 Shared images are often expressed as 
axioms; for example, 
 The preeminent feature of international politics today has become 
the conflict between international terrorists and rogue states and 
the democratic world. 
 The United States has an obligation to aid any nation fighting 
international terrorism.  
 Concessions made under pressure constitute appeasement, which 
only whets the appetite of aggressors.
51
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Shared images tend to shift as circumstances evolve. When events of great 
magnitude occur, policies and decisions tend to change in response.
52
 As previously 
discussed, events such as the Pearl Harbor, the collapse of the Berlin Wall or the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 are of the magnitude with the ability to shift shared images. The mood of 
the general public also possesses the ability to shift shared images, but the time it takes 
for policy to shift in response is quite substantial.
53
 With the understanding that shared 
images are susceptible to change, the perceived image that SOF is primarily a CT force, 
can and should be shifted. In order to achieve this shift a clear and concise narrative of 
SOF’s utility is required. A firm understanding of this narrative is in the interests of all 
pertinent parties.   
3. Interests 
Interests play a significant role in determining the stand taken by players on a 
given issue or event. Interests in the bureaucratic politics model are classified as 
organizational, domestic, and personal.
54
 Organizational interests predominate in game 
playing, because representatives typically see their organization as vital to the national 
interest and thus invest substantial effort to ensure it is represented in every game. 
Domestic interests, though important, are typically not considered independently, but are 
factored into the national-security equation by senior players. Personal interests are 
generally aligned with individual self-preservation and tied closely with organizational 
interests; it is assumed that if organizational interests are maintained, personal interests 
will be protected as well.
55
 Together, these factors determine the stakes of the games and 
determine the stand the players will take.
56
  
Taking organizational interests further, organizational essence must also be 
considered. Halperin et al. define the organization’s essence as “the view held by the 
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dominant group within the organization of what its missions and capabilities should 
be.”57 A majority of the members of organization clearly understand what the 
organizational essence is, especially in cases where the promotion and career structures 
are the same. Even in these cases though, among the subgroups of these organizations 
conflict can arise in regards to the organization’s essence.58 Conflicts such as this could 
explain how the narrative of SOF utility is not properly perceived. Once the narrative has 
passed through senior members of the DOD, both military and civilian, the entire breadth 
of SOF’s utility could be lost in translation. Again, factors such as this will determine the 
stand the players will take while playing the games.  
4. Playing the Game 
How the game is played depends on the desired outcome, whether a policy or a 
decision to take action. Players come into the game with the power associated with their 
position, as well as the power of their organization. The player’s assumed power and his 
ability to control information on a given issue or event determines his advantage in 
bargaining with the other players and working towards an action.
59
 The decisions and 
actions arrived at are the result of compromise—players pulling together, hauling, and 
pushing others towards a decision in line with a desired outcome.
60
  
In addition to the “pulling and hauling,” the junior players in the action games 
provide their expert advice to the players within the decision games before any action is 
taken. With the advice, the decision game, then, is played within a relatively fixed policy 
space. Since the policy space is slow to evolve, the expert advice given is bounded to the 
realm of the possible, but more importantly, is expected to aide in reaching the desired 
outcome. As result, the information and perception that is flowing up to inform these 
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decisions proves to be critical, as the players making decisions are not subject matter 
experts and rely heavily on those who are.  
B. THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL AND THE GRAY ZONE 
This research finds that input into the policy, decision, and action games, whether 
in the realm of CT or irregular warfare, is heavily based on the expected outcome and 
how that relates to desired outcome. Given the fluidity of the environment between war 
and peace, an agile model such as the bureaucratic politics model is helpful in explaining 
how high-level policies and decisions are made in response to Gray Zone problems. 
Alternative models, insofar as they depend on immense information gathering and in-
depth analysis that attempts to minimize ambiguity, may be highly rational, but they are 
ill suited for Gray Zone realities, where issues are intricate and opportunities are fleeting. 
Among its benefits, the bureaucratic politics model permits shortcuts, allowing the 
players to fall back on their interests and past experience.
61
 The bureaucratic politics 
model, specifically in its action games and action channels, provides a conduit for junior 
players to provide expert advice. This is critical, as players in the decision-making roles 
cannot be expected to be subject-matter experts on every situation in the gray zone. These 
junior players assist in shaping how their actions and organizations are perceived by the 
players in the decision game, as discussed in the following section. 
C. WHAT INFLUENCES POLICY-MAKER PERCEPTIONS? 
Jerome Bruner, a leading researcher in the field of perception, asserts that, 
“perception involves an act of categorization,” meaning that categorization is based on 
the amount of information that can be readily absorbed by the receiver.
62
 Once 
information is taken in, the receiver attempts to categorize it. If an object or situation is 
familiar and simple, less information is required to complete the categorization; if 
complex, more information is needed. The information may come from a vast array of 
inputs, but if no further data is available, the item is likely placed into an existing, well-
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 Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane observe that once an idea, 




The activity of categorization is governed by the principle of simplicity, described 
by John Steinbruner as the mind’s effort to “keep the structure of belief as simple as 
possible.”65 Typically, and especially under stress, the mind attempts to associate 
complex perceptions and processes with an established category.
66
 Thus, familiar ideas 
and experience may serve as blinders, narrowing the field of thought and realm of 
conceivable alternatives.
67
 Morton Halperin cites categorization theory to explain how a 
politician may use established understandings to diminish his or her need for the deep 
analysis of complex problems, such as the deployment of SOF.
68
 The authors argue that 
among the problems inadequately perceived by policymakers, to the potential detriment 
of the mission and national interest, are the environmental ambiguities of the Gray Zone 
and the uses of SOF as a political and military asset. 
For simplicity, this research categorizes SOF categorization according to the 
criterion of capability, investigating both formal and informal influences on this 
categorization. Formal influencers as those that originate through officially sanctioned 
channels. While informal influencers are unofficial, they may directly affect the 
perception of SOF.  
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1. Formal Influences  
The authors note that SOF does not and should not attempt to influence 
policymakers in respect to American foreign policy. Civilian control over the tool of 
force must be respected.69 It is incumbent on SOF, however, to provide sound and 
objective information so that policymakers have accurate perceptions of SOF and its 
uses. The formal methods of influence available are events such as congressional and 
staff-delegate visits (STAFFDEL, CODEL), papers and documents published through 
SOF units and academic outlets, and divisions such as Special Operations Legislative 
Affairs (SOLA).  
STAFFDEL and CODEL visits may occur at the tactical unit or as high up as 
SOCOM headquarters. These visits often serve a specific purpose, such as a funding 
review, or may simply allow a policymaker to meet service members in his district. For 
most STAFFDEL and CODEL visits, the unit provides either a static or training display 
involving a demonstration of equipment and capability. Because the time allotted tends to 
be short, units typically choose to show a complete capability, such as an eye-catching 
direct-action skill set. The skills and capabilities emphasized have a clear and direct 
impact on how SOF is perceived and categorized by policymakers.  
SOF publications include magazines such as Tip of the Spear, Special Warfare, 
and Ethos, in which the SOF services have an opportunity to shape perceptions both 
inside and outside their community. Though distributed widely, from policymakers to the 
most junior SOF team members, these periodicals focus on an internal audience. To 
influence outside perceptions, SOF primarily relies on papers in academic journals and 
forums.  
SOLA has operated in Washington, D.C., since the 1980s as the liaison between 
SOCOM and policymakers.
70
 Its primary role is to provide policymakers with the 
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information relevant to policy decisions. While SOLA’s activities are most closely tied 
with bills on allocation and manpower, its ability to interact directly and in an official 
capacity allows it to represent SOCOM and SOF elements to policymakers.  
2. Informal influences 
Informal influences on SOF are not necessarily within their control. Prominent 
among these are news coverage, SOF depictions in popular entertainment, and social 
media.  
The CNN effect, which states that round-the-clock media coverage by 
broadcasters such as the Cable News Network may affect the application and scope of 
foreign policy and the use of force, is a challenging concept to scope.71 Media coverage 
of SOF activity may spike for a number of reasons, from SOF’s increasing involvement 
in missions to the direct access now available to the media. As Steven Livingston 
describes in “Clarifying the CNN Effect,” historically SOF or Special Operations low-
intensity conflict (SOLIC) missions were viewed as highly sensitive, with little to no 
coverage permitted to protect operational security.
72
 The current media coverage of SOF 
is widespread, from embedded journalists to near real-time press releases on operations. 
The trend of the last 10 years is to increase transparency in military action; this has had a 
major impact on the amount of direct media coverage that SOF operations 
receive.
73
News coverage is not the only source of media influence; the movies watched 
by everyone are watched by policymakers as well. Four recent blockbusters have 
centered on SOF operations: “Zero Dark Thirty,” “Lone Survivor,” “Act of Valor,” and 
“Black Hawk Down.” All reached number one at the box office and grossed roughly 
$100,000,000.
74
 The ability of the mass media to influence a population has been much 
                                                 
71 Eytan Gilboa, “The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International 
Relations,” Political Communication 22, no. 1 (2005): 27–44, doi: 10.1080/10584600590908429. 
72 Steven Livingston, “Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to 
Type of Military Intervention,” Shorenstein Center, January 1, 1997, Fig 4, 9, 
http://shorensteincenter.org/clarifying-the-cnn-effect-media-effects-and-military-intervention/.  
73 Laurie R. Blank, “Military Operations and Media Coverage: The Interplay of Law and Legitimacy,” 
in Routledge Handbook of Military Ethics, ed. George Lucas (New York: Routledge, 2015), 348–362 
74 Zero Dark Thirty ($132,820,716), Lone Survivor ($154,802,912), Act of Valor ($81,272,766), and 




 and it can be assumed that the widespread penetration of these films has 
shaped audience perceptions of SOF. The plots of these movies hinge on SOF direct 
action. Although other aspects of irregular warfare may also be included, they are 
typically incidental, an adjunct in building up to a direct-action sequence.  
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTION 
Policymaker perceptions boil down to their mental categorizations of SOF and 
how these perceptions may provide them with the greatest returns. According to Bruner, 
most items are placed for convenience into a narrowly defined category.76 Individual 
policymakers judge the role and utility of Special Forces based on the placement they 
give SOF; but a collective perception is also in play. Morton Halperin employs the 
concept of “shared images,” that is, perceptions shared by a large group of people, in 
observing, “it is rare for the images shared within the government to diverge radically 
from those in society as a whole.”77 If policymakers overwhelmingly perceive SOF as a 
simple direct-action tool, this shared image will inevitably alter the employment of SOF 
in the Gray Zone, and SOF’s greatest utility will be the execution of direct-action 
missions such as CT. Thus, perception may create an ever-narrowing spiral of unused 
SOF potential. This understanding of perception is critical when moving into the BPM. 
The model shows that there are channels for experts to provide feedback and inform 
decisions; but perception may be used as a cognitive shortcut. This shortcut, 
unfortunately, may be based on perceptions that fail to realize the breadth of SOF utility 
and could lead to the misapplication of SOF as a tool. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter lays out the bureaucratic politics model as a tool for analyzing the 
case studies in the following chapter and highlights what perception is, how it is formed, 
and what its implications may be. This chapter further demonstrates how the perception 
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of SOF utility is formed, how the bureaucratic politics model plays out, and how, 
combined, these two factors affect the application of SOF. It is shown that policymaker 
perception, as revealed in the bureaucratic politics model games, is important to the 
decision making behind SOF employment in the Gray Zone. In Chapter IV, the 
bureaucratic politics model is used to reveal perceptual factors in SOF deployment. Case-
study criteria and selection are presented, along with two historical cases of Gray Zone 
SOF deployment to illustrate this influence at work. 
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IV. GRAY ZONE STUDIES: SOMALIA AND THE PHILIPPINES 
This chapter examines the use of SOF in Somalia in 1992–1993, and the 
Philippines in 2000–2015. Using the bureaucratic politics model as a framework and 
evaluating players, decision games, and outcomes, the processes involved in the choice to 
employ SOF are identified. These examples suggest that if SOF is given a clear and 
concise policy objective and the time to assess, plan, and execute a complete irregular 
warfare campaign, it may achieve policy objectives in a Gray Zone environment. Given 
unclear guidance and hurriedly applied in a restricted role, however, the likelihood of 
failure is high. In support of these conclusions, this chapter presents the selection criteria 
for these cases and provides background, United States policy in regard to the country in 
question, identification of the players involved, discussion of the decision game and 
outcome, and a summary of the case. The chapter concludes with a brief look at the 
findings in both cases.  
A. CASE CRITERIA AND SELECTION 
Kapusta’s article “The Gray Zone” identifies 57 instances of U.S. military 
involvement in the ambiguous environment between war and peace. The criteria for 
inclusion in this list are “…missions falling short of a declared war, yet important enough 
to send American service members into harm’s way.”78 The following additional criteria 
were used to choose the case studies explored in this thesis: 
1. U.S. interest or policy was at stake, but not above the threshold of “war.” 
2. SOF were involved. 
3. The conflict/incident was concluded. 
The cases selected occurred in Somalia and the Philippines and offer significant 
contrasts for purposes of analysis. SOF involvement in Somalia occurred in the pre–9/11 
world and lasted six weeks, while the Philippine engagement occurred just prior and 
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post–9/11, and ran fifteen years. The results of U.S. involvement in these conflicts have 
implications not only for SOF but U.S. foreign policy as well. 
Both cases are subjected to the bureaucratic politics model decision game to 
uncover factors that led to the employment of SOF, specifically the role of perception, 
based partly on the feedback loop from the action channel. This empirical analysis assists 
in discerning the complexity involved in SOF employment and suggests the strong 
influence that perception has on decision making.  
B. SOMALIA 
Somalis… are natural-born guerrillas. They will mine the roads. They will 
lay ambushes. They will launch hit-and-run attacks… If you liked Beirut, 
you’ll love Mogadishu. To what end? To keep tens of thousands of Somali 
kids from starving to death in 1993 who, in all probability, will starve to 
death in 1994 (unless we are prepared to remain through 1994)... I have 
heard estimates… that it will take five years to get Somalia not on its feet 
but just to its knees… Finally, what will we leave behind when we depart? 
The Somali is treacherous. The Somali is a killer. The Somali is as tough 
as his country, and just as unforgiving… We ought to have learned by now 
that these situations are easier to get into than to get out of, that no good 
deed goes unpunished. 
—Cable from Smith Hempstone, 
U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, 1989–93,  




Ambassador Hempstone’s warning on entanglement in Somalia, though colorful, 
did not deter the U.S. decision to intervene. The U.S. intervention in Somalia in the early 
1990s has inspired volumes of literature, due its complexity and impact on U.S. policy. 
This research examines the case through the bureaucratic politics model, focusing 
primarily on the decision game to arrive at how the decision was made to use SOF, the 
interfered role that perception played, and implications for SOF use in the future. The 
object is to determine whether a short-term goal, such as a limited use for CT operations 
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in the Gray Zone, requiring an irregular warfare approach, is likely to support long-term 
policy objectives.  
1. Background  
In 1992, Somalia was without a central government. Civil war raged among its 
many clans, and people were dying of famine on a biblical scale.80 According to the 
United Nations (U.N.) High Commissioner for Refugees, between 240,000 and 280,000 
persons were killed and up to two million displaced.81 The international community 
understood that someone needed to step in. At the time, with the recent end of the Cold 
War, there was only one true superpower presumed capable of reversing course in 
Somalia—the United States. Following the lead of the United Nations, the decision to 
intervene was made by the Bush administration and engagement continued through the 
initial years of the Clinton administration.  
A large military footprint was planned to support the intervention, with the 
understanding that once the area was secure enough to deliver aid, the major 
responsibility would fall back on U.N. forces. Though Somalia was not necessarily 
secure, this transition occurred in March 1993. A critical aspect in the devolution of 
responsibility was that Army Special Forces and Psychological Operations units, which 
had been monitoring, working with, and influencing Somali clans, were no longer part of 
the force package. Leadership among the outgoing U.N. forces felt that without this 
critical element, the incoming U.N. personnel would experience a lack of engagement at 
the local level.82  
Almost immediately following the transition, the powerful Habr Gidr clan, led by 
Muhammad Farah Aideed, attacked U.N. forces, killing or injuring many, including U.S. 
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service members, and precipitating a decision to bring in SOF.83 SOF were on the ground 
for just over a month when disaster struck: on 3 October 1993, Aideed’s forces shot down 
two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters, killing 18 service members, injuring many others, and 
detaining one soldier for 11 days. Some estimates place the Somali casualties at over 
1,000. This mission led to the immediate removal of SOF and of remaining U.S. forces in 
the following months. This departure had a much larger impact than simply the decision 
to leave Somalia84—it considerably influenced subsequent U.S. policy.  
2. United States Policy  
The U.S. policy on Somalia changed frequently during the intervention and was 
geared towards solving immediate problems with no tie-in to specific long-term policy 
objectives.85 The ad-hoc posture caused constant shifts in objectives for the military and 
other organizations, creating confusion among the many players noted in the bureaucratic 
politics model action channel and frustrating the long-term goals of the intervention. The 
initial Bush policy was something of a moral policy in the name of humanitarian 
concerns—the “foreign policy of Mother Teresa,” as Michael Mandelbaum called it.86 
When the Clinton administration took over, the policy on Somalia shifted almost 
immediately, centering on Somalia as a test bed for demonstrating collective security in 
the post-Cold War era. It was assumed that success in Somalia would lessen the burden 
on the United States in future interventions.87  
The Clinton policy, very heavy in its military aspect and with no apparent 
relationship to long-term objectives beyond security, continued to morph with the 
metastasizing ground situation in Somalia. In August and September of 1993, as it 
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became apparent that the military option could not achieve the desired outcome in and of 
itself, a policy for a dual track of military and political solutions was cobbled, and in a 
matter of weeks, this dual track was quickly scrapped in favor of a political solution. The 
shift in policy was not clearly communicated to those in the action channels, specifically, 
to the SOF element employed in removing Aideed, which continued with business as 
usual.88 After the disastrous mission in October, U.S. policy changed again. Seven 
months after this mission, President Clinton issued presidential-decision directive (PDD) 
25 to provide guidance in determining whether the United States should involve itself in 
future peacekeeping operations.89 Thus, one tactical-level incident conducted by SOF 
changed foreign policy. But why and how had the decision to bring in SOF been made in 
the first place? 
3. Players and Decision Games 
The situation in Somalia had many moving parts, which meant many players were 
involved at various levels. This thesis focuses on those involved in deploying SOF 
against the problem of Aideed. Some players in the decision game also played a role in 
the action game and the action channel, as well as the feedback loop the action channel 
provided to the decision game. The action game was determined by the decision to use 
military force. Which forces were employed and the manner in which they were 
employed changed over time to reflect the fluidity of the policy governing the overall 
situation. The requests and advice received from the action channel prove critical in 
determining what the eventual outcome would be. 
a. Players 
Ambassador Jonathan Howe, special envoy for the U.N. and a retired U.S. 
admiral, was the head of United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) II. UNOSOM 
II was charged with ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid and bringing security to the 
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area to facilitate Somalia’s return to functionality. Ambassador Robert Gosende was the 
head of the U.S. liaison office in Mogadishu.90 Both men had roles as junior players in 
the decision game and action channel, and were broadly aligned with Department of State 
interests in the matter.  
Two senior players—the Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell—also had stakes in both arenas, as it would be 
their forces utilized and they were also advisors to the President.91 The commander-in-
chief of Central Command General Joseph Hoar; the deputy commander of UNOSOM II 
forces and commander of U.S. Forces Somalia Major General Thomas Montgomery; and 
the commander of Joint Special-Operations Command and Task Force Ranger (TRF) 
Major General William Garrison were junior players in the action channel, providing 
insight and advice from the feedback loop to the players in the decision game.92 
Junior players who played solely in the decision game were members of the 
National Security Council Deputies Committee, specifically the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy Frank Wisner.93 Ambassador David Shinn also was a junior player in 
the decision game as the Department of State coordinator for Somalia, as well as the 
leader of an interagency assessment team.94 The final player in the decision game was the 
individual who had the ultimate say, President Clinton. 
b. The Decision Game 
In response to two key events in mid-1993—the attacks on U.N. forces in early 
June 1993 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 837, which followed the attacks—
Ambassador Howe, acting through the feedback loop of the action channel, initiated the 
decision game for bringing SOF in. Howe, as a result of Resolution 837, authorized all 
necessary means of retaliation, ordered Aideed’s arrest, and offered a $25,000 reward for 
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information. He also sent a request to the United States for reinforcements, specifically 
naming SOF. He felt these measures were required to achieve the U.N. mandate, which 
he believed was in his personal interests and the interests of UNOSOM II and the United 
States. Howe received reinforcements, but not including SOF. Undeterred, he continued 
his request,95 reasoning that through SOF, a timely result could be achieved and the 
problems plaguing Somalia would be more easily resolved.96 Other players began to add 
their support for bringing in SOF. Based on the outcome Howe desired, it is interfered 
that his perception of SOF to have been limited to a narrow CT capability.  
Ambassador Robert Gosende, working from within the feedback loop of the 
action channel, also supported SOF deployment against Aideed. Gosende identified 
Aideed as a terrorist in the hope that this would add credibility to the request—again, due 
presumably to his perception of SOF’s utility, specifically in CT.97 Howe and Gosende 
clearly believed that Aideed was the linchpin in solving the greater problem within 
Somalia. Both felt that with Aideed out of the picture, a United Nations-supported 
Somalia could become functional once again.98 This thinking was in line with the 
organizational interests of the United Nations and Department of State, which suggests 
the reason these players were motivated to diagnose Aideed as an overarching problem 
who needed to be dealt with quickly, rather than just the symptom of a greater problem in 
Somalia. What they advocated was a quick solution to a small problem, with limited ties 
(if any) to long-term goals. 
At this juncture, Secretary Aspin, General Powell, and General Hoar were 
opposed to deploying SOF, believing it was not in the best interests of the Department of 
Defense as an organization or the nation. From the action channel, shoring up this 
argument, General Hoar argued that there was a 25 percent chance of finding and 
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capturing Aideed. These players believed that Howe’s requested use of SOF was a 
shortsighted fix.99 
The players on the National Security Council Deputies Committee supported 
pulling in SOF. The committee was contemplating a dual-track policy, both political and 
military, in dealing with Aideed. Their recommendation was to exclude Aideed from a 
political reconciliation while still pursuing him militarily. The request from Howe and 
Gosende for SOF was beginning to gain traction with the members of this committee. 
Following his trip to Somalia, Ambassador Shinn briefed Aspin, Powell, and the 
Deputies Committee, recommending that Aideed be apprehended and that SOF be used 
to do it.100 It is assumed that Shinn’s perception of SOF utility lay heavily in its CT 
capability. Meanwhile, the request for SOF was gaining ground within the action channel 
as well. 
Major General Montgomery, deputy commander of U.N. forces and commander 
of U.S. forces in Somalia, also supported deploying SOF, whether they be United States 
or British. Coupled with this request, Major General William Garrison, commander of 
Joint Special Operations Command, told Powell that SOF personnel from his command 
could accomplish the mission.101 Both generals were acting in the interests of their 
organizations, but it would take more to bring about a choice in the decision game than 
the interests of those in the action channel—there would have to be an argument to sway 
the DOD players that were part of both the decision game and action channel. Pairing this 
argument with ongoing events in Somalia would serve to strengthen the claim. 
Undersecretary of Defense Wisner, who was also a member of the Deputies 
Committee, provided the argument that persuaded DOD senior players and Aideed 
provided the events that supported Wisner’s rationale. Against the advice of staff, some 
of whom had SOF backgrounds, Wisner argued that unless the Aideed problem were 
handled, specifically with SOF, U.S. casualties would mount. Since the attacks in early 
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June 1993, Aideed had killed a number of U.N. forces and on 8 August, four U.S. service 
members. In two attacks later in August, ten more U.S. service members were injured. 
Wisner’s argument, coming from within the DOD, combined with the requests of 
commanders in the field, and bolstered by U.S. casualties, played to the DOD’s interests 
and was enough to sway Aspin and Powell.102 This pulled the DOD closer to what DOS 
desired and what Senator John Warner later called eventual and reluctant compliance 
with “civilian control.”103  
Aspin took the recommendation to the President for approval. It is assumed that 
Clinton felt it was in his best interests to accept this recommendation, on the premise that 
if SOF were successful in removing Aideed, his policy of collective security stood a 
better chance of success. Clinton approved the use of SOF on 22 August. Three days 
later, Task Force Ranger, led by Major General Garrison and comprising approximately 
440 SOF and support personnel, was in Somalia.104 
4. The Outcome 
Owing to Task Force Ranger’s inability to apprehend Aideed as quickly as 
anticipated, some players experienced buyer’s remorse within weeks of the decision to 
send SOF. The Deputies Committee initiated a new decision game, discussing a single-
track option of seeking a solely political solution with Aideed.105 Ambassador Howe 
attempted a 48-hour truce with Aideed, which ended in the deaths of more U.N. 
forces.106 Ambassador Gosende recommended through an official cable to the DOS to 
negotiate a solution with Aideed, possibly with exile as an option.107 Secretary Aspin 
announced yet another shift in U.S. policy: that the United Nations must ratchet up its 
commitment in Somalia for the U.N. mission to succeed. The result of U.N. inaction, 
according to Aspin, would be a return of Somalia’s security situation to its status prior to 
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the arrival of U.S. forces. General Hoar stated that U.N. mission exceeded the available 
resources and recommended that objectives be scaled back.108  
On 25 September, General Powell informed President Clinton that he needed to 
send more troops to complete the mission or pull U.S. forces out. The Clinton 
administration publicly changed its policy regarding Aideed two days later. The policy 
was now strictly political and Aideed would no longer be pursued militarily; rather, a 
new Somali government would be created without him.109 This decision and change in 
policy never made it the commanders on the ground, and the disastrous raid conducted on 
3 October rendered all previous decisions and policy shifts for naught. The images 
broadcasted worldwide, a product of the CNN effect, of dead U.S. soldiers dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu, had implications for SOF and U.S. foreign policy for 
years to come. 
5. Summary 
The case of U.S. intervention in Somalia demonstrates a misapplication of SOF in 
a Gray Zone environment. Through the decision game, shortfalls in the decision-making 
process are revealed as stemming from limited perceptions of SOF utility and a single-
pronged, poorly communicated campaign. The inferred perception of SOF by players 
who wanted to employ them was limited to only one aspect of SOF capability, namely 
CT—which greatly hindered the possibility of achieving desired outcomes. Limited 
perception was combined with the following factors to compromise the chances of 
success: 
 Short-term objectives poorly unrelated to long-term goals 
 Lack of a comprehensive campaign plan 
 Promotion of organizational interests over prudential policy  
 An emphasis on quick return on investment 
 Ever-changing policy 
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Had Army Special Forces and Psychological Operations remained part of the 
force package following the transition to U.N. forces, the mission of clan engagement, 
paired with the apprehension of Aideed, would have had a better chance of producing 
results aligned with the desired outcome. This combined effort would necessarily have 
used SOF capabilities more broadly. 
Two key implications emerged from this SOF operation. The first was the change 
in foreign policy on intervention in peacekeeping operations, as expressed in PDD-25. 
Peacekeeping is typically the exact the type of operation that occurs in the Gray Zone 
environment. While limiting U.S. intervention when there is doubt as to whether national 
interests are at stake is prudent, doing so from misunderstanding of the capabilities of the 
U.S. military, specifically in regard to SOF, is a self-imposed and self-defeating 
limitation that must be acknowledged and resolved, despite any queasiness induced by 
the debacle in Somalia.  
The second implication is that the CNN effect, which was novel at the time, 
presents a whole new conduit for shaping the perception of SOF. The CNN effect is what 
the world now expects: near real-time operations revealing what has resulted from a 
decision making process, such as the bureaucratic politics model. According to Sean 
Naylor, the Somalia operation led to reactionary micromanagement and risk aversion, 
which is detrimental not only to SOF, but the U.S. military as a whole.110 Heeding 
Ambassador Hempstone’s warnings would apparently have been wise, especially in the 
decision whether to commit America’s premier fighting forces to a dubious mission. 
C. OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM – PHILIPPINES 
Let me touch on Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines because it 
offers some lessons…. First and foremost, U.S. operations there were 
shaped by assessments. These assessments occur before the plan is 
developed and these assessments are continually updated through the 
duration of the operation. Assessments conducted by special operations 
personnel are critical to providing information that can cause adjustment 
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to the campaign plan as well as support balance and coherency among the 
ends, ways, and means of strategy. 
—COL(R) David Maxwell,  
2012 HASC hearing on Understanding Future Irregular Warfare111 
 
The U.S. involvement in the Philippines illuminates how SOF can be effectively 
employed in a Gray Zone environment. U.S. interests in the Philippines from 2001–2015 
were tied directly to the attacks of 9/11, terrorist kidnappings of U.S. citizens, and the 
depredations of trans-regional terrorist groups. Official U.S. involvement under the 
umbrella of Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P) ended in 2015, with the 
closure of Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF–P) and the transfer 
of future SOF operations authority to embassy-based personnel.112 This case is unique in 
that the main effort was directed by SOF under a SOF headquarters, though non-SOF 
units were involved. It is also singular in that the operation employed almost all varieties 
of available SOF and the full spectrum of irregular warfare.  
In the Philippines case, both a positive perception of SOF at the time and an 
understanding of SOF’s capabilities helped decision makers develop a sound course of 
action towards achieving long-term U.S. goals. BPM analysis shows how the decision to 
employ SOF was made and shaped by the players involved, specifically in the decision 
game. The action game is also investigated, showing that the strong influence of SOF 
perception allowed its continued employment and long-term success.  
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1. Background  
The Philippines is rife with a history of insurgencies, both religious and political, 
since its colonization by the Spanish in 1521.113 When the United States assumed control 
of the Philippines after the Paris Treaty of 1898, it inherited rebellion and insurgency.114 
The United States–Philippines relationship ebbed and flowed until the United States 
recognized Philippine independence in 1946 and pulled all military bases out of the 
country in 1992. The relationship didn’t end there, but did dramatically slow. In the 
interim, a number of Muslim insurgencies grew in strength, while the capability of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) waned.115 Organizations in the southern 
Philippines, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG), and Jama Islamia (JI), took advantage of the security situation by expanding 
operations.116  
Terrorist organizations grew more and more emboldened, with ASG perpetrating 
kidnappings and beheadings of U.S. citizens in the early 2000s. In August 2000, ASG 
took a U.S. citizen hostage from Jolo Island and in May 2001, brazenly kidnapped three 
U.S. citizens from a resort on Palawan Island.117 The hostages, Garcia and Martin 
Burnham and Guillermo Sobero, were moved to the ASG safe haven of Basilan Island. 
On June 11, 2001, the ASG beheaded Sobero to gain media exposure for their cause; the 
media failed to note the story, but ASG’s actions drew increased attention from the U.S. 
government.118 Following 9/11, the United States turned its attention to al Qaeda-linked 
organizations in the southern Philippines, tying the ASG and JI directly to Osama Bin 
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Laden and al Qaeda and strengthening the case and resolve for military intervention in 
the Philippines.119  
a. United States Policy Regarding the Philippines 
The first change in U.S. policy toward the employment of SOF in the Philippines 
occurred in 2001, with the approval of a U.S.-led train-and-equip mission to create a CT-
capable force within the AFP. The overall shift in policy toward military action was 
spurred by the ASG kidnappings and connections to al Qaeda. Although the United States 
had never broken military ties with the AFP, American involvement had been limited to 
bilateral exercises and Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) following the closure 
of U.S. bases in 1992.120 The kidnapping of multiple U.S. citizens by the ASG in 2000 
and 2001 changed American policy.121 In early 2000, the State Department CT 
coordinator called for SOF to initiate a training program under Title 22 Chapter 22 to 
build CT capability, specifically direct action, into a newly formed AFP unit, the Light 
Reaction Company.122 The attacks of 9/11 served to redefine U.S. policy in the 
Philippines, where the U.S. government opened a second front in the war on terrorism, 
OEF–P, under congressional authorization for military force.123 At the time, most U.S. 
military and political attention was focused on Afghanistan; but policy dictated OEF–P to 
become a priority, it fell upon the players at PACOM to determine a military course of 
action.   
2. Players and Decision Games 
This section looks at the players involved in SOF employment in the Philippines, 
the decision games and how they played out, and how the action game’s continuous 
feedback loop affected final choices. Of particular interest is that SOF, serving in the 
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action channel, was allowed to assess the environment and draw up a course of action to 
meet policy goals. This case is unique in that SOF was provided a clean canvas. From 
this liberty, SOF created a plan that incorporated all the key elements of a complete 
irregular warfare campaign. 
a. The Players 
A unique characteristic of this case is that much of the decision game was pushed 
or deferred to levels much lower than would normally be expected. The senior players at 
the time—the CJCS, JCS, and SECDEF—were involved in the decision to employ SOF 
in the Philippines, but their focus after 9/11 was Afghanistan, the pursuit of Al Qaeda, 
and the buildup for Iraq. Thus, many of the players in the Philippines case were 
positioned close to the action channel, but their actions were hitting at the junior-player 
level. One of the primary junior players in this game was Admiral Dennis Blair, the 
Commander in Chief of Pacific Command. Admiral Blair was one of the most powerful 
U.S. figures in the area, with a higher profile than any state department official.124 
Another junior player was Ambassador Michael Sheehan, the state department 
counterterrorism coordinator. Sheehan’s background was unusual; before working for the 
state department, he was as an Army Special Forces officer.125 Nonetheless, his current 
interests aligned with the Department of State.  
The second group of players falls within the action-channel game as critical in 
conducting assessments, filling the feedback loop, and executing decisions made. 
Brigadier General Donald Wurster, the commander of Special Operations Command 
Pacific served as advisor to the PACOM commander and as the commander of Joint Task 
Force 510, the JTF in charge of operations after 9/11. Colonel David Fridovich, the 
Commander of 1
st
 SFG(A), served at the core of the assessment teams and was the 
primary planner of SOF employment. Lieutenant Colonel David Maxwell, the 
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 SFG(A), commanded the primary forces provided for the 
first and second round of operations.  
b. The Decision Game 
The decision game played out in three rounds. The first round was the 2000 
decision to employ SOF to develop a Philippine CT capability; the second was the 
response to 9/11 and use SOF in creating a second front in the war on terrorism. The third 
round was the decision to continue supporting OEF-P, using SOF as the primary force.  
Following the kidnappings of early 2000, the United States took a stronger 
interest in the potential of the AFP. Members of the U.S. embassy team, headed by Major 
Joseph Felter,126 devised a plan to increase AFP capability, which was briefed to 
Ambassador Sheehan by Felter.127 Their interaction is a clear example of the feedback 
loop between the action channel and the decision game, in which a player such as Felter 
in the action channel provided direct input on a need or capability to a junior player, 
Sheehan.  
This ability of a player in the action game to provide direct feedback to a junior 
player with influence enabled the decision game to move rapidly. As Sheehan pushed for 
a policy change to increase SOF involvement, the plan called for Title 22, Chapter 22, 
authorities to build an indigenous CT force.128 This decision forced a decision to use 





 Special Forces Group deployed an SF company to train the Philippine Light 
Reaction Company in February 2001 and completed training in July. Although the AFP 
command failed to employ the Light Reaction Company properly, SOF actions allowed 
the input of new information into the action channel and positively influenced the 
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perception of SOF in the arena.130 This accurate perception and understanding of SOF 
capabilities proved invaluable as the 9/11 attacks dramatically increased U.S. 
involvement in the Philippines.  
As 1
st
 SFG(A) prepared a second round of training with the Light Reaction 
Company, 9/11 changed the scale and approach employed. The Bush administration 
called for a second front in the Philippines to target groups such as ASG and MILF.131 
Clear connections between these groups and al Qaeda drove the creation of this second 
front, while the kidnappings strengthened the decision.  
The policy decision to employ the military in the Philippines quickly left the 
Washington beltway and came into the hands of the Pacific Command (PACOM) 
commander, Admiral Dennis Blair. Admiral Blair’s first requirement was to create a 
course of action that met policy objectives.132 The plan devised for the Philippines was 
crafted almost exclusively at PACOM headquarters, although the ultimate decision on 
force employment would be made by the President and Secretary of Defense, the choice 
of plan rested with the PACOM commander. Of those organizations engaged in creating 
an operational plan, SOCPAC had the advantage of established relationships and forces 
already in place.  
An additional asset that SOCPAC brought to the decision game was the high 
standing of SOF on a national level in the United States. The Philippine government slow 
rolled the agreement to allow U.S. forces to operate in their country.133 Meanwhile, the 
United States initiated operations to overthrow the Taliban and eliminate al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan. These operations were spearheaded by the CIA and Army SF, with 
additional SOF to support operations added in late September and early October of 2001. 
As SOF handily routed the Taliban, a scene communicated through formal and informal 
perception channels, its success, coupled with the success of SOF training in the 
Philippines, shaped the perception of Special Forces as agile and capable of anything.  
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Philippine operations in early 2001 also dramatically influenced the perception of 
SOF by policymakers, both in DC and in the U.S. embassy in Manilla. Because the Light 
Reaction Company training was funded under Title 22, its reporting requirements 
funneled directly through the embassy, enhancing the formal perception of SOF. It is 
assumed that as SOCPAC and PACOM plans developed, the ambassador’s counsel was 
sought by the President and other senior players. If the Philippine ambassador’s 
perception of SOF was other than favorable, doubtless any plan that identified SOF as the 
primary force would have reflected his reservations.   
As the decision game played out, it was strongly influenced by the action game. 
Admiral Blair requested courses of action from his subordinate components; one of the 
first presented was to use U.S. Marines to clear Basilan Island of ASG and rescue U.S. 
hostages. Blair solicited the counsel of his SOF representatives to determine the 
feasibility of such a plan, demonstrating, as a junior player, a well-considered outreach to 
the action channel for input on a plan that exceeded his knowledge base.134  SOF 
feedback was that any unilateral action, or even joint action that included U.S. forces 
actively fighting, would result in a complete loss of rapport with the Philippine 
government and more importantly, its people.135  
The SOCPAC command, under the guidance of Brigadier General Wurster, 
initiated a full-blown assessment of what was required in the Philippines. Wurster 
assigned 1
st
 SFG(A), led by Colonel Fridovich, to form a terrorism coordination and 
assistance visit (TCAV), consisting of Fridovich, selected individuals from 1
st
 SFG, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Dave Maxwell.136 This team formed the core of the SOF action 
channel as it assessed the situation in the Philippines, wrote a plan of action, and 
provided a two-way conduit for information from PACOM and SOCPAC into the 
Philippines, and information out. The TCAV gathered data such as the capabilities of 
SOF partners and the willingness of the Philippine command to collaborate.137 Its ability 
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to communicate directly up the channel allowed the TCAV to convey a clear 
understanding of how potential scenarios and the capabilities of SOF in the Gray Zone.  
Once the TCAV completed their assessment, the plan was briefed to Brigadier 
General Wurster and Admiral Blair. The final plan was briefed in January 2001 and 
forwarded to Washington, D.C., pushing the process out of the action channel and back 
into the decision game. The decision to use SOF and employ Joint Task Force 510, 
SOCPAC’s deployable headquarters, under the authority of Operation Enduring 
Freedom–Philippines was approved by the JCS and signed by its chairman, General 
Richard Myers, on February 2, 2002.138  
Execution fell under the title of “Exercise BALIKATAN 02–1,” so dubbed to 
appease members of the Philippine government and not startle the local population. With 
Wurster as commander, members of SOCPAC, 1
st
 SFG(A), civil affairs, and 
psychological operations deployed to train, advise, and equip the AFP involved over 
1,300 U.S. service members.139 The mission on Basilan, as described by Colonel David 
Maxwell was “to conduct unconventional warfare operations in the southern Philippines 
through, by, and with the AFP to help the Philippine government separate the population 
from and to destroy terrorist organizations.”140 BALIKATAN 02–1 was widely seen as a 
success; it eliminated the majority of ASG on Basilan Island and increased the 
operational capabilities of the AFP. This is not to say that the AFP became a sterling 
example of military efficiency, but there was measurable improvement, and with U.S. 
support, the AFP conducted successful operations. When Balikpapan 02–1 concluded in 
late July 2002, the SOCPAC staff and a majority of the personnel deployed in support of 
the operation departed the Philippines. Left behind were one Special Forces Company 
and four ODAs—less than 70 personnel.141 These forces remained in the country under 
the authority of OEF–P. 
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The choice of ways ahead returned back into the decision game. The PACOM 
commander again requested courses of action to pursue ASG members who had fled 
from Basilan to the islands of Jolo and Tawi Tawi. The second round played out much 
like the second. In this iteration, SOF held even higher standing and the command and 
staff at PACOM had a better understanding of SOF capabilities—an understanding that 
was undoubtedly also heightened among the JCS and their staff. That SOF capabilities 
were on display in the Philippines for six months before the second round in the decision 
game occurred provided SOF with a unique advantage. SOCPAC presented a plan similar 
to the first, emphasizing pushing Army SF teams further south with their AFP partner 
forces. The Marines, again, presented a plan for beach landings and clearing Jolo Island. 
ADM Blair selected the SOCPAC plan. 
3. The Outcome 
In the interim following BALIKATAN 02–1, Joint Special Operation Task 
Force–Philippines was established and SOF remained in the country until 2015, when the 
mission came to an end. Throughout OEF–P, SOF remained the lead agency for planning 
and execution. Although OEF–P has ended and JSOTF–P has closed, U.S. SOF continues 
to engage with their AFP counterparts, maintaining the relationships of trust cultivated 
over 13 years of conflict.  
4. Summary 
The case of U.S. involvement in the Philippines from 2001–2015 demonstrates a 
proper application of SOF in the Gray Zone. By employing the bureaucratic politics 
model decision game, the decision process is revealed as strongly influenced by a 
thorough understanding and positive perception of SOF. When players in the decision 
game have an accurate perception of SOF and allow the time and resources needed to 
assess and plan an operation, SOF can deliver desired results according to a clearly 
defined policy. In the Philippines, U.S. policy remained clear and consistent, and 
SOCPAC and PACOM followed a campaign plan that supported stated policy goals. The 
success of this case also depended on U.S. sensitivity to Philippine perceptions, the 
choice to respect Philippine sovereignty, and the use of a holistic irregular warfare 
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approach. The focus was not on killing terrorists, but on building capacity in the military 
and government connections with the population.  
The long-term effects of this case are yet to manifest, but the paucity of literature 
on this second front of Operation Enduring Freedom indicates the minimal study it has 
received. It is urged that the decision game and action-channel interaction involved in 
OEF–P, as well as its products, be looked to as a model for future engagements.  
This chapter has examined recent uses of SOF in Somalia and the Philippines. In 
both cases, the bureaucratic politics model is used to analyze players, decisions, games, 
and outcomes and identify how the decision to employ SOF was reached. In the case of 
Somalia, poor understanding of the problem, vague policy guidance, and a restrictive 
application of SOF capability contributed to mission failure. In the Philippines, those in 
the action channel had time to properly assess the problem; clear guidance was given 
through policy; and a robust and consistent irregular warfare campaign was applied. 
These cases suggest that when the U.S. decides to engage in a Gray Zone environment, 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined two case studies of SOF use in the Gray Zone—in 
Somalia in 1992–1993 and the Philippines in 2000–2015. Using the bureaucratic politics 
model as a framework and evaluating players, decision games, and outcomes, the choice 
to employ SOF has been replayed and outcomes evaluated in an empirical light. This 
chapter briefly reviews findings, draws two major conclusions from the case studies, and 
recommends additional Gray Zone conflicts case studies for further research. The 
military does not determine the outcomes of decision games—that is the prerogative of 
policy makers. Nevertheless, the recommendations in this research may help 
policymakers towards a rounded and accurate perception of the SOF capabilities 
available and how they are meant to be used.  
A. FINDINGS 
This research suggests that if SOF is given clear and concise policy objectives and 
the time to assess, plan, and execute a thorough irregular warfare campaign, it is likely to 
achieve policy objectives in the ambiguous environment between war and peace. If, 
conversely, SOF receives unclear guidance that must be followed rapidly, using a fraction 
of its competency, the likelihood of failure is high. The two case reviewed in this thesis 
illustrate the extremes of SOF application and results. Although every environment is 
different, the lessons from these cases can be applied to any proposed involvement of 
SOF in the Gray Zone, given proper logistical support and permission to execute a 
complete irregular warfare campaign.  
This research suggests that in the evolving global threat environment, 
conventional thinking and outdated bureaucratic structures in which the interests of the 
organization are paramount and top echelons are isolated from direct communication 
with the field are unlikely to succeed in the Gray Zone. The habituated thinking of senior 
decision makers and the interests of formidable bureaucracies will not accommodate 
reform quickly or without growing pains—yet cognitive and organizational change must 
occur. President Obama’s selection of General Votel to command U.S. Central Command 
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may indicate that change is underway,142 as, for the first time, a career SOF officer will 
command a U.S. geographic combatant command. An unflagging effort to ensure that 
Gray Zone and irregular warfare concepts are well understood by senior decision makers, 
together with promotion of the spectrum of SOF capabilities, remains vital, if the United 
States is to meet foreign-policy goals.  
SOF originated with the military’s need to operate effectively in the space 
between war and peace and differs from traditionally organized forces in that it is not 
designed around a weapon system or platform, but rather, relies on the operator as key. 
The individual SOF team member is the weapon—not because of high-tech gadgetry or 
the latest shooting techniques they employ, but because of their ability to nimbly and 
rapidly use unorthodox concepts and unconventional approaches to accomplishing 
missions. Deployed in small formations near the apex of a conflict, SOF is the most 
effective means to wage irregular warfare and the optimal choice for directly or indirectly 
achieving policy objectives where controlling a population by lethal or nonlethal means is 
the goal.  
Using Allison and Halperin’s bureaucratic-politics model, this research finds that 
interests, shared images, desired outcomes, and perceptions all influence a decision 
maker’s choice of action and method by which to act. This thesis focuses on policymaker 
perceptions of SOF and how they affect SOF utilization. Whether notions of SOF 
capability are adopted formally or informally, perception plays a powerful role in the 
decision game, and, as pertains to SOF, may have grave policy implications.  
B. KEY LESSONS FROM SOMALIA AND THE PHILIPPINES  
The case studies presented in this thesis illuminate two critical elements in the 
decision game, which is the aspect of the BMG that most affects the outcome of the 
action channel.  
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1. Establish Long-Term Objectives 
Senior players in the decision game must establish clear and concise long-term 
objectives. Conflicts within the Gray Zone are complex and often fluid in their 
connection to global events—but without definitive and realistic goals, players in the 
action channel cannot move past the operation’s immediate demands. The U.S. 
intervention in Somalia demonstrates that lack of clarity concerning long-term goals may 
have devastating effects on the action channel’s success. The concrete long-term 
objectives at work in the Philippines allowed an approach that, over time, attacked the 
problem from multiple angles and ultimately supported a more workable irregular 
warfare strategy than was pursued in Somalia.  
2. Know Your Limits 
Senior players within the decision game must have a clear understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations of the chosen methods in the action channel. In Somalia, a 
decision was made to use SOF in a very narrow manner to solve a problem that was in 
reality but a symptom of greater problems. This narrow focus crippled any long-term 
positive effects of U.S. involvement. The decision to limit SOF activity in Somalia was 
due partly to an incomplete perception of SOF capabilities by senior and junior players 
and inadequate input from the action channel before and during the operation. By 
contrast, senior players in the Philippines had a good grasp of SOF capabilities through a 
better-informed perception of capabilities and a functional feedback loop between the 
decision and action channels. In themselves, these elements are not enough to ensure 
successful Gray Zone action; but without them, the application of military force will start 
at a grave disadvantage in complex situations. 
C. SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL 
ANALYSIS 
The authors suggest research into the dynamics of additional decision games. 
Though U.S. involvement in the Salvadoran civil war occurred more than 30 years ago, 
the challenges and operations of this conflict closely parallel those seen in modern Gray 
Zones. Despite significant friction experienced by junior players in the action channel 
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(much of it from conflicts among the DOD and inter-agencies and perceptions left over 
from the Vietnam War),143 the U.S. involvement was viewed as a policy success.144  
Another potential case for analysis is the U.S. mission against the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), which is still underway. The atrocities committed by LRA 
strongman Joseph Kony led the DOS to designate him a terrorist in 2008.145 Through 
executive order, four clear objectives were subsequently issued: increase civilian 
protection, remove Kony and senior LRA leaders, promote defections and support 
reintegration, and continue humanitarian assistance.146 This clear, consistent guidance is 
likely to achieve success.  
Once the pertinent documents are declassified, the process by which policy was 
created for the Gray Zone conflicts in Ukraine and Syria will reward analysis. SOF was 
used to various degrees in these operations, with player perceptions of SOF an important 
factor. Findings from these and other cases will confirm trends encountered in the 
decision game and provide a resource by which senior players may better inform their 
decisions before committing to an action. 
D. WHAT’S NEXT? 
Figure 5 presents a graphic representation of the findings of this research in the 
context of the bureaucratic politics model game model. The action game is expanded to 
include the methods used to achieve policy objectives commonly identified within the 
field of international studies.  
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Figure 5.  Gray Zone Conflict147  
In this figure, policy establishes the long-term objectives that help focus the 
intention of the decision game and direction of the action channel. The decision game’s 
output is the method of intervention within the action channel that will accomplish 
desired objectives. The intervention options available to senior players within the 
decision game are categorized as diplomatic activity, military operations, and covert 
action.148 Each option has a congressionally mandated institution that manages its 
execution. The authors submit that military operations within the Gray Zone should favor 
IW methods over traditional warfare as regards the action channel. This does not 
minimize the utility of traditional warfare; it simply means that irregular warfare must 
take precedence during campaigns in the Gray Zone. Irregular warfare allows the 
multifaceted application of military force that focuses on relevant populations, uses SOF 
as the primary maneuvering element, and represents these operations as enacted by some 
entity other than U.S. forces. Currently, these concepts remain obscure to many senior 
players in the decision games and a clear narrative is needed to complete their perception.   
Senior players will not be prepared to establish successful policies for military 
force within the Gray Zone so long as their perceptions of SOF are limited or incomplete. 
If irregular warfare is to emerge strongly as a viable method within U.S. policy, a clear 
and concise narrative of SOF capabilities must be promulgated. ARSOF 2022 establishes 
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the distinction between special warfare and surgical-strike operations within Army SOF, 
but fails to lay out for policymakers how actions taken with the range of available options 
can mutually support each other in irregular warfare campaigns.149 To correct 
policymaker perceptions, the SOF narrative must move beyond CT to incorporate all 
aspects of irregular warfare. The global threat environment suggests that conflicts within 
the Gray Zone will not subside in the near future. If the United States is to prevail within 
this environment, decision-maker perceptions of special operations forces and irregular 
warfare must be accurate and complete. 
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